Organizational Learning as Cognitive Re-definition:
Coercive Persuasion Revisited
Edgar H. Schein
MIT Sloan School of Management
Copyright 1997 The Society for Organizational Learning. All rights reserved.
Generative Learning and Culture Change as Coercive Persuasion
The purpose of this essay is to link the concept of coercive persuasion,
popularly known as "brainwashing" to the concept of
cognitive re-definition or reframing which is an essential element
of what has come to be called generative learning. Adaptive
learning is applying the same old concepts or skills in new ways. Generative
learning or what Argyris and Schon (1974, 1996) call
"double loop learning," what Bateson (1972) called "deutero-learning,"
and what Michael (1973) called "learning to learn" requires
the learner to reframe, to develop new concepts and points of view,
to cognitively re-define old categories and to change standards
of judgment. Such changes increase the learner's capacity to deal with
situations in new ways and lay the basis for developing
radically new skills (Senge, 1990).
When we speak of "culture change" in organizations we are typically
referring to this level of learning (Schein, 1992). The
magnitude of changes required can be appreciated when we observe that
the kinds of culture changes being advocated and touted
involve "building trust and openness," "empowering employees," asking
employees to "commit" to organizational tasks, asking
managers to work in "flat and lean" organizations, asking previously
competitive units to become "teams," and so on. To make
changes at this level requires more than behavioral change. It requires
the learner to reframe the situation, to learn new concepts
and to develop new attitudes or the behavior changes will not last
once the immediate incentives are removed. If we are to
understand the full implication of such generative learning and culture
change, it is essential to understand how cognitive
redefinition comes about, and, to this end, we must understand coercive
persuasion.
Many contemporary proponents of organizational learning, notably Peter
Senge, argue that generative learning is not only
necessary for organizational survival and growth but that it is, in
the last analysis, the only consistent advantage that organizations
will have over their competitors. Implicit in this point of view is
the idea that if one develops the right set of "capacities" for
learning, generative learning becomes a voluntary, even pleasurable
process. But, as I will argue, in order to develop those
capacities one must undergo a learning process that is functionally
equivalent to what POWs underwent in the communist prison
camps and that involves at the early stages periods of sufficient anxiety
to motivate learners to reject the learning situation unless
they are coerced either by physical restraint, positive incentives,
or the threat of loss of desired rewards to remain in the learning
situation.
Most generative learning involves questioning one's basic assumptions,
and this is an inherently anxiety provoking process that will
be resisted. At the extreme this resistance takes the form of simply
not grasping what the new concepts are and dismissing them
as irrelevant. The coercive element of coercive persuasion comes into
play in that the easiest way for the learner to avoid the
anxiety of examining his or her own tacit assumptions is to walk away
from the situation. For the learning process to begin,
therefore, requires either some incentives and/or some constraints
that keep the learner in the learning situation. If the incentive is
to learn and the learner is inwardly motivated to go through the pain
of learning, so much the better. But the key is that the learner
must remain in the situation even though it becomes painful at times.
Before exploring the analogy to coercive persuasion further it
is necessary to describe what the POW experience consisted of.
Coercive Persuasion Described
Coercive persuasion as a concept was first developed in trying to understand
the seeming conversions and collaborative behavior
of prisoners of war who were subjected to interrogation and indoctrination
during World War II and particularly during the Korean
conflict (Schein, 1956, 1961). Whether they were military POWs or civilians
arrested suddenly in their homes, their interrogators
routinely treated them as guilty and accused them of crimes, of espionage,
and of holding values that were inimical to "the people."
Most prisoners reported that they were convinced of their innocence,
they did not have a clue what the interrogators were talking
about, and if pressures got severe enough they were willing to sign
false confessions, to engage in collaborative behavior, and to
allow themselves to be used in propaganda activities such as posing
for pictures, but they never accepted their guilt. They were
coerced but not persuaded. On the other hand, there was a substantial
number of civilians including students, businessmen,
missionaries and members of various local religious orders who had
lived in China for decades who came away from several
years of imprisonment admitting their guilt, saying that they had been
spies and criminals, and expressing gratitude to the Chinese
Communist captors for being treated leniently given the magnitude of
their crimes (Lifton, 1956; Schein, 1961). For all intents and
purposes they had undergone a generative learning process, though,
in this case, the outcome was viewed as undesirable from our
point of view. What made it generative rather than adaptive is that
the repatriates really came to believe in their guilt and many of
them worked on behalf of their communist captors to bring the message
to others after they were released and "free" to think
whatever they liked.
I described the process these prisoners went through as "coercive persuasion"
to indicate that if a prisoner was physically
restrained from leaving a situation in which learning was the only
alternative, they would eventually learn through a process of
cognitive redefinition. They would eventually come to understand the
point of view of the captor and reframe their own thinking so
that the judgment of having been guilty became logical and acceptable.
In effect they had undergone what might be called a
"conversion" experience except it did not happen in the sudden way
that religious conversions are often described.
The essence of this process, from the point of view of the captor, was
to create a situation in which several conditions obtained
simultaneously:
The prisoner was put in jail with an indeterminate
sentence, articulated by the captor as "you will never get out of here
until
you make a sincere confession and accept your
guilt as a spy and criminal, and recognize how your bourgeois values are
an
inherent danger to the communist people."
The prisoner was put into a group with others
who were more advanced in their learning process.
The group was rewarded on the basis of its
total progress; only if all the members learned the new point of view would
they
get more privileges and fewer punishments.
The new point of view was presented in many
ways--personally by the interrogator, by lectures, by printed materials
and by
more advanced group members in informal discussion.
The main vehicle for learning and assessing
the degree of learning was the written confession and self-criticism which
was
required as a regular activity and served
to stimulate the prisoner to rethink his or her past actions and begin
to assess them
from a new point of view.
Any evidence that the prisoner was beginning
to grasp the new point of view or new concepts was instantly rewarded and,
on the other hand, any evidence of insincerity
or superficiality of understanding was severely punished.
Communications that in any way reinforced
the old point of view or that reminded the prisoner of his or her links
to old
membership or reference groups were withheld,
e.g. mail from home was delivered only if it contained bad news such as
the message that a spouse was seeking a divorce
or that a valued friend had died.
Physical pressures of all sorts were constantly
applied to weaken the prisoner's physical strength, with sleep deprivation
being the most potent of these pressures;
"torture" was only used as a punishment for insincerity or lack of motivation
to
learn.
Psychological safety was produced for the
prisoner by fellow prisoners who were farther along in their re-education
and
could be supportive of the target prisoner's
effort.
In this kind of physical, social and psychological milieu the process
of learning can be thought of as occurring in several stages.
Because western prisoners came into the situation with a clear self-image
and set of judgments about what crime, guilt, and
espionage meant, their first potent experience of being arrested, accused
of guilt, thrown into jail and threatened with dire
consequences if they did not confess served as a powerful "disconfirmation."
But how could they confess if they did not believe in
their own guilt and did not have a clue what it was all about, except
the rationalization that it was a giant mistake that would shortly
be cleared up. They were certain that they could convince the interrogator
of their innocence and that the arrest must have been a
mistake. When the interrogator would counter with "you are guilty because
you have been arrested, we do not arrest innocent
people," the prisoner would simply not understand what that could mean
except that it was a mistake or a miscarriage of justice.
If the prisoner was in a group cell, he or she might discover others
who were similarly convinced of their innocence and a few
who said "you are guilty." The new prisoner's first reaction would
be that the cellmates must being "crazy" or that they had been
planted there to confuse him or her. But as days, weeks, and months
went by with no mail, no outside intervention, constant
further interrogation and pressures to write a confession and self-criticism,
prisoners would begin a process of self-examination.
Most everyone is, after all, guilty of something so one's generalized
capacity for guilt began to be felt as possibly connected to the
present plight. But there was still no insight into what the captor
meant by guilt since the prisoners "knew" they were not
government agents, had not sent intelligence information home, and
had, in fact, done nothing but lead their ordinary life in
pre-communist and after the takeover communist China.
I am suggesting that this sense of frustration and puzzlement which
comes about from being heavily disconfirmed is comparable to
what it feels like to an employee or manager when they are told that
the way they have worked for decades is no longer adequate
and that they will have to learn some completely new concepts and skills
in order to retain their jobs. For someone who has spent
a lifetime in individualistic competition to be told that their concepts
and prior behavior are now "wrong," that they now have to be
a team player, share their insights, help their peers, trust their
bosses and commit completely to the welfare of their employing
organization might seem just as "crazy."
How then do either the prisoners or the employees get past this fundamental
impasse? Two further psychological processes had to
come into play before cognitive redefinition became possible. First,
the level of survival anxiety or guilt had to be strong enough to
lead the prisoner to psychologically surrender, to give up, to experience
despair, or in Alcoholics Anonymous terms to "bottom out."
The essence of this state is that the person accepts that he or she
is no longer in control and that "higher powers" will determine
his or her fate. The person is now willing to put him or herself into
the hands of others and what this amounts to is accepting the
possibility that the captor may have some knowledge or power that one
must begin to pay attention to. The defense of denial, the
sense that this is unreal and one will be released at any moment, that
justice will prevail, the sense that the interrogator captor is
just playing a game has to be given up. But even this is not enough
for new learning to occur. It is possible to continue in this state
of despair.
The second process that had to come into play was that the prisoner
had to begin to feel psychologically safe in this state of
openness and vulnerability. If there was insufficient psychological
safety and despair was high enough, the prisoner would
experience a mental break and deny reality in a psychotic way. To become
open to new information, the prisoner had to feel some
support for the new learning process that was now going to begin.
In the political prison this support was provided by the "good interrogator,"
or, more typically, by the cell mates who now became
supportive because the new prisoner was displaying signs of willingness
to learn. In effect the cell mates became mentors to the
prisoner and showed him or her how to think in new ways, how to cognitively
re-define certain critical concepts. But they could
not do this until the prisoner was "ready," until enough disconfirmation
and anxiety had built up to allow the prisoner to let go of his
or her prior assumptions of injustice and invulnerability.
At this point prisoners began to identify with one or more of their
cellmates who were more advanced in their learning and through
them learn some of the concepts that underlay the structure of communist
thinking. For example, they learned that a "crime" was
not, as westerners thought, an act that could be proven to be harmful
and against a law; a crime was any action that could at any
time in the future become harmful to "the people." In a collective
groupist society, self-seeking was a crime because it harmed or
could harm others whether or not one consciously intended it. Prisoners
learned that middle class "bourgeois" attitudes led to
behavior that was automatically harmful, such as a Jesuit Mission employing
lower class Chinese houseboys or gardeners and
thereby exploiting them to do the menial work. Writing postcards home
about the beautiful ricefields in the country was
automatically espionage because that information could at some point
be of value to an enemy. At the extreme there were
examples that seemed ridiculous such as defining rolling over in one's
sleep into someone else's space in a crowded cell as
"imperialistic expansionism." But however ridiculous it seemed, the
conceptual system hung together and gradually the prisoner
came to recognize how all kinds of innocent acts from a western point
of view were crimes from the communist point of view.
"Cognitive redefinition" involved two different processes. First, concepts
like crime and espionage had to be semantically
redefined. Crime is an abstraction that can mean different things in
different conceptual systems when one makes it concrete.
Second, standards of judgment had to be altered. Even within the western
concept of crime, what was previously regarded as
trivial was now seen to be serious. The anchors by which judgments
are made are shifted and the point of neutrality is moved.
Behavior that was previously judged to be neutral or of no consequence
became criminal, once the anchor of what was a
minimum crime was shifted. These two processes, semantic re-definition
and changing one's anchors for what is good or bad,
acceptable or unacceptable, are the essence of cognitive re-definition.
It is through these two processes that "reframing" occurs.
But it is only possible for these processes to occur once the learner
has developed the openness that comes from despair and
found the psychological safety to begin to learn.
It should be noticed that both semantic shift and shift in anchor is
necessary for genuine reframing to occur. One can engage in
semantic shifts alone and "understand" how someone else might define
crime differently and thereby enlarge one's intellectual
horizons. But that alone does not produce voluntary behavior change.
It is when one recognizes that one's prior behavior is from
the new point of view "bad," that one has truly reframed the concept
and launched into a learning process of how to avoid such
bad behavior in the future. By identifying with their cellmates prisoners
came to see that what they had done was indeed harmful
and could, then, make a sincere confession.
Once a sincere confession had been made, prisoners were usually released
fairly quickly, leading to the assertion by the
repatriates that they had been leniently treated given the magnitude
of their crimes. The western reaction that this was bizarre
behavior resulting from "brainwashing," reflected the western semantics
and standards of judgment, leading to the irony that the
repatriates now felt just as the interrogator had felt in regard to
them--"you just don't understand."
What does all of this have to do with organizational learning?
Generative Organizational Learning as Coercive Persuasion
I would suggest that generative organizational learning puts most managers
and employees into a situation comparable to the
prisoner in a political prison. It is not a spontaneous joyful process
to give up one's beliefs, values and concepts in favor of untested
and inimical new concepts and anchors for judgment. It is not a particularly
comfortable situation to be subjected to re-engineering
or culture change programs with the clear threat that unless one participates
wholeheartedly one might lose one's job. Particularly
at a time when downsizing and massive layoffs are the order of the
day, change or learning programs are likely to be viewed as
highly coercive.
The executive who launches these programs is not likely to appreciate
the degree to which they become coercive, nor the degree
to which they challenge the assumptions on which the organization has
previously been built. For the learning process to begin,
some heavy disconfirmation is likely to be required, leading to high
levels of both survival and learning anxiety, and ultimately to the
creation of despair. Only when enough psychological safety has been
provided will the learner even hear the new message, much
less accept it and internalize it.
It may seem absurd to the reader to draw an analogy between the coercive
persuasion in political prisons and a new leader
announcing that he or she is going "to change the culture." However,
if the leader really means it, if the change will really affect
fundamental assumptions and values, one can anticipate levels of anxiety
and resistance quite comparable to those one would see
in prisons. The coercive element is not as strong. More people will
simply leave before they change their cognitive structures, but
if they have a financial stake or a career investment in the organization,
they face the same pressure to "convert" that the prisoner
did.
To the extent that the analogy holds, one can now see what the problem
is. The new cultures that are usually called for involve
concepts, attitudes, and skills that are typically not understood in
the first place, nor accepted even if partially understood.
Consider, for example, what it means to impose a "culture of teamwork"
based on "openness and mutual trust" in an individualistic
society that has operated by competition and survival of the fittest
and has created by this means one of the most powerful
economic systems in the world. So either the person calling for the
new culture does not understand what he or she is really asking
for, or the targeted managers and employees simply will not understand
or accept it and the leader will find him or herself in the
same position the interrogator was in with prisoners who kept insisting
that they were innocent.
In a similar vein, consider what it means to "empower" employees, to
ask them to participate and to become committed to
organizations that have been built on the "divine rights" of managers
to hide essential economic information from employees on the
grounds that it is none of their business, that have treated stockholders
as the only constituency worth responding to seriously, that
are driven by the capital markets on the one hand and technological
imperatives on the other hand. Consider what employee
empowerment implies for the levels of management whose whole careers
have been built on supervising the people below them.
Consider what it means to abandon hierarchy in favor of "flat organizations
of inter-locking and inter-dependent project teams with
shifting leadership and membership" in organizations whose very essence
has been hierarchy as the prime means of coordination
and control, and the major means of identifying career progress. Consider
what this means to managers whose power has been
based on their organizational position, whose very concept of management
has been to be "over" others, to give orders, to call the
shots, to be individually accountable, to be a successful rugged individualist.
Consider what it means to shift the emphasis from caveat emptor and
"you can have any color so long as it is black" to creating
not only satisfied but "delighted" customers who are encouraged to
want and demand anything, anytime, anywhere. Consider what
it means to abandon our linear cause and effect way of thinking and
substitute systems thinking. Each of these kinds of changes
involve extensive semantic redefinitions of core concepts such as "managing,"
"coordinating," "teamwork," "interdependency," and
"commitment," and drastic changes of the anchors around concepts like
"quality," "customer satisfaction."
It is one thing to advocate from an outsider or academic perspective
that organizations will have to adopt such new assumptions,
learn that they actually work, and, thereby, gradually build up new
kinds of organizational cultures. It is quite another thing to
expect that just advocating such new assumptions will bring them into
being. Organizations will either have to go through painful
periods of coercive persuasion, or they will have to start with new
populations of employees and managers who hold such
assumptions in the first place. In either case, it is likely to be
a long and difficult road so one should not kid oneself that cultures
can be ordered up and cooked like restaurant meals. And even if we
successfully impose and/or learn new assumptions, we still
do not know whether they will make organizations more effective or
competitive. New cultures can be imagined, but they will only
be created by experienced success over a long time.
The more one thinks about it, the more one sees that imposed culture
change and coercive persuasion are quite similar. It remains
to be seen whether the level of organizational change that is implied
by "generative" learning can be accomplished without imposed
culture change. And if such imposed culture change is involved we must
accept the reality that learning may involve some painful
periods of coercive persuasion. One of the most difficult aspects of
this reality is that we cannot ignore that the same methods of
learning, i.e. coercive persuasion or colloquially brainwashing, can
be used equally for goals that we deplore and goals that we
accept. In making organizations more competitive we may well resort
to methods that under other conditions we would deplore.
But when we encounter resistance from managers and employees who are
the target of these change programs we should not be
surprised. They may be reacting to the methods as much as the message.
They may resent the feeling that they have to learn new
concepts, attitudes, and skills "or else." We cannot escape the moral
choices that then have to be made. The issue is similar to that
faced by parents of children who have joined cults that have used coercive
persuasion. Are the parents in turn justified in
kidnapping their child out of the cult and using a deprogrammer to
coercively persuade them back to a set of values that the
parents are more comfortable with? Are managers justified in imposing
new methods of thinking on employees who have been
programmed by decades of industrial experience to think in a certain
way?
These are not easy questions to answer, but it is time we looked at
organizational learning realistically and accepted the fact that
for most members of the organization the choice between holding on
to their prior beliefs and learning new beliefs, values,
concepts, and behaviors is often not a choice at all. Not to learn
means loss of job or career advancement. Learning therefore is a
coercive persuasion process whether we admit it or not.
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